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ABSTRACT 
With the of the Cold War, it is time for the United 
States to reassess its embargo against Cuba. Without the 
help of the former Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc 
countries, Cuba is no longer a threat to the United States. 
While the embargo, in conjunction with the loss of Soviet 
support, is imposing severe economic hardship on the Cuban 
population, Fidel Castrc. · 1 · ·.s regime continue to hold 
their firm grip on the cow~t .. Thus, the ultimate goal of 
destabilizing the government has 1.ot been reached. In order 
for the United States to be in a posit:.on to encourage and 
influence a transition to democracy in Cuba, instead of the 
chaos that could result from destabilization, it sil':.Uld work 
toward closer relations with Cuba by ending the embargo, 
encouraging U.S. investment in Cuba, and a freer e~cnange of 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has 
been searching for and trying to create a new strategy for 
its foreign policy. For years, the opposition to communism 
has shaped and determined U.S. policy. This has been true 
also of its policy toward Cuba. The U.S. embargo against 
Cuba has been in effect for over 30 years, and at one time 
was the best policy option available even though it has 
still not achieved the ultimate goal of destabilizing Fidel 
Castro's regime by weakening Cuba's economy. 
This thesis will show that even though Cuba's economy 
has been hurt through a combination of economic sanctions 
and the withdrawal of military and economic aid by the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern bloc countries, Fidel Castro 
has been able to maintain political control over the country 
through the use of repression, the encouragement of Cuban 
nationalism, and shifting the blame for its economic 
problems from the Cuban government to the handy scapegoat of 
U.S. imperialism. 
The stated goal of the embargo against Cuba is the 
destabilization of the Cuban government. However, the 
question must be asked: can the goal of destabilization 
best be reached by maintaining the embargo? Or will lifting 
the embargo be more likely to achieve this desired result? 
I argue that lifting the embargo would be a more effective 
means of destabilization since an increased communications 
v 
and information flow between the United States and Cuba is 
more likely to trigger the desire to reform. 
Finally, U.S. policymakers need to look beyond mere 
destabilization of the Cuban government and get themselves 
in position to influence a transition toward a democratic 
government in Cuba. Again, the best way to do this is to 
drop the embargo and work toward a more friendly 
relationship with Cuba. The United States has been willing 
to do this with other communist countries such as China and 
Vietnam, even though their governments are less than perfect 
in the eyes of U.S. policymakers. For instance, President 
Clinton recently dropped the threat to remove China's most 
favored nation (MFN) trading status in spite of China's 
human rights policies. He instead chose to renew their most 
favored nation status in order to place the United States in 
a position from which it could influence their behavior. 
Our current policy toward Cuba is becoming obsolete. Both 




The U.S. embargo agai.nst Cuba has a history nearly as 
long as Castro's revolutionary government itself. The goal 
of this embargo is to weaken and eventually topple the Cuban 
government and encourage a democratic government to take its 
place. The embargo, in conjunction with the fall of the 
Soviet Union and its subsequent withdrawal of economic 
support to Cuba, has seriously hurt Cuba economically. But 
is the embargo achieving its political goal of weakening the 
existing government and encouraging democratic opposition to 
that government? This is an important factor to consider. 
My original plan was simply to examine two competing 
hypotheses: 
1. If the United States continues its embargo against Cuba, 
it will lead to the fall of the communist regime. 
2. Lifting the U.S. embargo against Cuba will lead to the 
fall of the communist regime. 
As the thesis progressed, an additional issue began to 
emerge. Fidel Castro's regime cannot last forever, with or 
without the embargo, although he currently remains in firm 
control of the situation. Bearing this in mind, what is the 
1 
best policy stance for the United States to take in order to 
influence the transition to a democratic government? The 
ultimate goal of the United States should not only be the 
fall of the current regime, but also the establishment of a 
democratic government to take its place. It is not in the 
U.S. interest for Castro to be dispelled simply to be 
replaced by chaos and a possibly violent fight for power. 
Whether it wants the title or not, the United States is 
looked on as the world's policeman, especially in the 
Western Hemisphere. A power struggle in Cuba could force 
the United States into a military intervention which would 
be both costly and difficult to extricate itself from. 
Historically, U.S. military occupations in Latin America do 
not have a particularly good record for leading to 
democratic regimes. In fact, the opposite is true. Once 
the United States withdrew after an occupation, the 
situation usually returned to the status quo, or worse. 
Good examples of this were the U.S. occupation of Veracruz 
in Mexico, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Cuba early in the century. 
This thesis will give a brief history of the embargo, 
will look into the economic and political impact of the 
embargo both in the United States and in Cuba, and will 
examine the issue of whether it is achieving its goal, as 
well as the methods which Castro's government uses to remain 
in control and in power. Some of these methods are: 
repression, appeals to nationalism, and inflammatory 
2 
rhetoric against United States imperialism. Finally, 
another question to be addressed is whether the embargo 
should be continued, or is a new policy toward Cuba more 
appropriate now that the Soviet Union is no longer a factor 
and the East-West conflict is in the past? 
3 
!! . HISTORY OF THE U.S. EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA 
The history of the U.S. emoargo against Cuba began 
shortly after Fidel Castro took power in 1959. The United 
States imposed an economic blockade on October 19, 1960, 
that banned all exports from the United States, with the 
exception of food and medicine. This occurred following an 
agreement in February 1960, with the Soviet Union, for $100 
million in credits to purchase industrial equipment and for 
technical assistance, an agreement to purchase 400,000 tons 
of sugar in 1960, as well as 4 million tons by 1964, and the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the 
Soviet Union on May 8, 1960, three days after the Soviet 
announcement that it had shot down a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance 
plane over Soviet airspace. The United States cancelled 
Cuba's sugar quota on July 5, 1960. Cuba retaliated by 
nationalizing U.S. businesses in Cuba. On October 17, 1960, 
Cuba nationalized the remaining U.S. banking institutions in 
Cuba. Beginning November 10, 1960, United States ships were 
not allowed to carry cargo to or from Cuba. In January 
1961, the situation worsened and the United States severed 
its diplomatic relations with Cuba. This was in response to 
Castro's insistence that the United States cut its embassy 
staff in Havana down to less than 20 personnel. Later that 
year, the Foreign Assistance Act, Section 20, gave the 
4 
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president authorization "to establish and maintain a 
complete commercial embargo" against Cuba. In April 1961, 
Castro proclaimed the socialist character of the Cuban 
Revolution, and in December, declared himself a Marxist-
Leninist. On April 17, 1961, U.S. trained and supported 
Cuban exiles launched the ill fated Bay of Pigs invasion of 
Cuba. On December 16, 1961, the United States implemented a 
complete ban, cutting any remaining exports to Cuba. It was 
followed by a complete commercial embargo in January 1962. 
The embargo wa~ extended in March 1962, covering all 
products that contained any material originating in Cuba, 
even if they were manufactured in another country besides 
Cuba. In August 1962, the Organization of American States 
(OAS), at the ur;ing of the United States, passed a 
resolution requesting its members to cut diplomatic and 
economic relations with Cuba. Mexico was the only member to 
disregard the request. Trying to enforce the embargo, the 
United States threatened to deny assistance to any country 
that allowed its ships to transport cargo to or from Cuba. 
In July 1963, the Cuban Assets Control Regulations 
prohibited U.S. citizens from having financial or commercial 
relations with Cuba. In 1964, the OAS imposed a formal 
economic embargo against Cuba, responding to Castro's 
attempt to export revolution throughout the hemisphere. 1 
1 James D. Rudolph, ed., Cuba: A Country Study, 3rd ed. 
(Washington, D.C.: American University, Foreign Area Studies, 
1985), pp. 40-44, 143, 219-220. 
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-- ~- -~ ________________________ ....... 
The embargo has undergone relaxation and tightening 
phases in its over 30 year history. During the early 
1970's, relations between the United States and Cuba were 
marked by restraint on both sides. A better understanding 
between the two countries was reached during the first half 
of the decade. Both sides had determined the preconditions 
for the resumption of diplomatic and trade relations. Also 
during this time, the United States initiated improved 
relations with other communist countries by establishing 
relations with China, signing agreements with the Soviet 
Union, and ending the war in Vietnam. More importantly, 
perhaps, Cuba put an end to the exportation of revolution to 
other Latin American countries. In 1975, the United States 
relaxed the embargo, allowing subsidiaries of U.S. companies 
to trade with Cuba, and visits by Congressmen, business 
people, academics, and journalists. Between 1980 and 1985, 
the embargo was tightened again. 2 This was no c"oubt due to 
President Reagan's (and Jean Kirkpatrick's) belief that 
Soviet-Cuban expansionism was a very strong and real threat 
to Central and South America, and in fact, to the entire 
world. 3 And in fact, there was reason for concern. The 
Nicaraguan Revolution in 1979, in which the Sandinistas 
overthrew Anastasio Somoza and instituted a Cuban style 
2Rudolph, pp. 56-57, 143. 
3Thomas Carothers, In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy 
Toward Latin America in the Reagan Years (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press, 1991), p. 119, and Rudolf, pp. 193-194. 
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socialist system, was supported by Cub~ and the Soviet 
Union. The marxist guerrilla group, FMLN, in El Salvador, 
which became active in 1980, is another prime example of 
communist expansionism in Latin America.• 
Most recently, on October 23, 1992, President Bush 
signed the Torricelli Bill, also called the Cuban Democracy 
Act, into law. This law further tightened the trade embargo 
against Cuba. 5 The law prohibits foreign subsidiaries of 
U.S. companies from conducting trade with Cuba and prevents 
ships that trade with Cuba from entering U.S. ports for six 
months. 6 The bill also authorized increased telephone and 
mail services to Cuba in order to appeal to the liberal 
votes in Congress. 7 It was sponsored by Representative 
Robert Torricelli who was chairman of the U.S. House of 
Representatives Western Hemisphere Affairs Subcommittee at 
the time, and who had close ties to Jorge Mas Canosa, 
4Ernest E. Rossi and Jack C. Plano, Latin America: A 
Political Dictionary (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 1992), 
pp. 90-91; PCC leadership membership found in: Central 
Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1992 (Washington, DC: 
n.p., 1992), p. 70. 
5Martin Koppel and Mary-Alice Waters, "Cubans 
Resist as New U.S. Law Tightens Economic Embargo," 
No. 40 (1992), pp. 1, 10. Abstract in Info-South. 





"The World from: Mexico City," Christian Science Monitor, 28 
Oct. 1992, p. 3. Abstract in Info-South. University of Miami: 
North-South Center. 
7Christopher Marquis, "Embargo Bill's Success Testifies to 
Exiles' Clout: Foundation Demonstrates Its Influence in 
Washington," Miami Herald, 28 Sep. 1992, Sec. A, pp. 1, 11. 
Abstract in Info-South. University of Miami: North-South Center. 
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chairman of the powerful Cuban American National 
Foundation.• The strategy, according to Torricelli, is to 
decrease money going to Cuba, while increasing the flow of 
ideas.' Trade between U.S. subsidiaries and Cuba had been 
growing before passage of the bill, tripling between 1988 
and 1990. By 1990, the latest year for which statistics 
were available, it had reached $705 million. 10 
Recently, Cuba has quietly been getting help from an 
unexpected quarter- the United States. Although the trade 
embargo is still in effect, the United States has been 
allowing about a thousand Cuban exiles to fly directly from 
Miami to Havana every week. These pilgrims, as a group, 
carry perhaps as much as $100 million a year to Cuba, to 
help their relatives with the rent, the purchase of 
necessities and luxuries, a business deal, etc. This travel 
has not been only from the United States. Cuba is also 
allowing, perhaps even encouraging, its citizens to visit 
the United States. According to the U.S. State Department, 
about 27,000 Cubans entered the United States on temporary 
'Paul Anderson and Christopher Marquis, "N.J. Congressman 
Makes Castro's Demise His Crusade: Get-tougher Bill Pushed by 
Torricelli," Miami Herald, 2 Feb. 1992, Sec. A, p. 8. Abstract in 
Info-South. University of Miami: North-South Center. 
'Christopher Marquis, "Cuban Embargo Bill Unveiled: Baker 
Defends Current Course," Miami Herald, 6 Feb. 1992, Sec. A, p. 21. 
Abstract in Info-South. University of Miami: North-South Center. 
10David Clark Scott, "Plan to Stiffen Cuban Ban Annoys U.S. 
Trading Allies," Christian Science Monitor, 23 Jun. 1992, pp. 1, 4. 
Abstract in Info-South. University of Miami: North-South Center. 
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visas. Eighty-five to 90 percent of them return to Cuba 
after a few months, without defecting to the United States. 
These people do not return to Cuba empty handed. They are 
able take back most of what they earn while in the United 
States. The Cuban government also extracts hundreds of 
dollars in fees from each of these travellers, including 
over $100 to request an exit permit, a $35 departure fee, a 
$35 reentry fee, and $135 per month to extend their visas. 
Between Cuban exiles travelling to Cuba, and Cuban nationals 
working overseas, Cuba receives at least $500 million per 
year. 11 This migration is an important source of U.S. 
dollars for Cuba. 
11Millman, pp. 66-67. 
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III. SANCTIONS: THEORY AND APPLICATION TO CUBA 
There are many opinions about the use of sanctions, for 
instance, when should they be used?; what are the best 
methods for implementation?; when are they likely to be 
successful?; how should success be determined? These a 
all valid questions to ask, and they are important for a 
government to consider when it is deciding whether or not to 
apply sanctions against another country. Each potentia~ 
sanction episode is unique and must be approached on a case 
by case basis. However, there are certain fundamental rules 
and variables that apply to all situations. This section 
will put forth some of these rules and variables. 
Sanctions are considered a tool of international 
diplomacy that may be used to coerce target governments (the 
governments of those countries against which the sanctions 
are imposed) into a certain response. Usually sanctions are 
imposed by big powers, simply because they are big and want 
to influence events on a global scale, and they are able to. 
Instances in which sanctions are used collectively against a 
target country are usually instances in which major powers 
have enlisted the help cf their smaller allies. There are 
three main reasons that countries impose sanctions: 1) to 
demonstrate their resolve. The United States has frequently 
used sanctions for this reason. 
10 
U.S. presidents seemingly feel compelled to 
dramatize their opposition to foreign misdeeds, even 
when the likelihood of changing the target country's 
behavior seems remote. In these cases sanctions 
often are imposed because the cost of inaction- in 
terms of lost confidence at home and abroad in the 
ability or willingness of the United States to act-
is seen as greater than the cost of the sanctions. 
Indeed, the international community often expects 
such action from the United States, to demonstrate 
moral outrage and to reassure the alliance that 
America will stand by its international commitments. 
The impact of such moral and psychological factors 
on the decision to impose sanctions should not be 
underestimated, even if it is hard to document. 12 
2) deterrence- the sender country (that is, the country 
imposing the sanctions) attempts to discourage the future 
implementation of objectionable policies by increasing the 
costs associated with those behaviors. In many cases it is 
very difficult, perhaps impossible, to determine whether the 
sanctions imposed were actually effective in deterring 
future misdeeds. 3) as a surrogate for other measures. 
They may by used as a more moderate measure, equivalent to a 
slap on the wrist, when more extreme measures are deemed 
inappropriate. The imposition of sanctions communicates 
three messages: 1) it tells the target country that the 
sender does not condone its actions; 2) it shows its 
allies that words will be backed up by actions; and 
12Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann 
Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current 
Policy, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Institute for International 
Economics, 1990), pp. 10-11. 
11 
3) it communicates to domestic audiences that the sender's 
government will take action to protect the nation's vital 
interests. 13 
There are five types of objectives that sanctions are 
used for: 1) modest policy change in the target country; 
2) destabilization of the target government; 3) 
disruption of a major military adventure; 4) impairment of 
the military potential of the target country; and 5) major 
policy change in the target country. 14 
Sanctions are frequently used in an effort to 
destabilize target governments. Often these attempts at 
destabilization have pitted a superpower against a smaller 
country. According to Hufbauer, et al, the United States 
has attempted destabilization efforts 15 times, often 
against other countries in the Western Hemisphere such as 
Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Brazil, Chile, and 
Panama. Sanctions played at least a modest role in the 
overthrow of Trujillo in 1961, of the Brazilian President 
Joao Goulart in 1964, of President Salvador Allende of Chile 
in 1973, and in the defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua 
in the 1990 elections. However, it took military 
intervention in Panama to remove Noriega despite the 
imposition of severe sanctions. Finally, Fidel Castro and 
13Hufbauer, p. 11 . 
14Robert E. Looney and Craig Knouse, 11 Predicting the Success 
of Economic Sanctions, 11 The Jerusalem Journal of International 
Relations, 13, No. 2 (1991), p. 44. 
12 
his regime in Cuba have not been toppled despite three 
decades of sanctions, in large part because of the aid 
received from the Soviet Union until recently. 15 
There are three main types of sanctions. Trade 
sanctions, which include both export and import sanctions, 
and financial sanctions. As far as trade sanctions go, 
export sanctions are used more often by sender countries and 
are considered to be more effective than stopping imports 
from the target country. This is because sender countries 
are more likely to play a bigger role as suppliers of 
exports than as buyers of imports. The United States is a 
good example of this. It plays a dominant role in the 
manufacture of military and high-technology equipment. 
Also, in the United States, Congress has granted the 
president much greater flexibility in restraining exports 
than in slowing imports. Exports may be easily stopped by 
using the mechanisms of the Export Administration Act, while 
imports can be slowed down only by using the more unwieldy 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the national 
security section (section 232) of the Trade Expansion Act of 
1962, or preexisting quota legislation (such as sugar or 
textile quotas). One problem with export controls is that 
they often result in a heavier burden on individual 
companies in the sender country. Import controls, on the 
15Hufbauer, pp. 6-7. 
13 
other hand, usually result in the burden being spread out 
and shared more widely. 16 
As stated previously, the uni~ed States has used all 
three types of sanctions (import and export, and financial) 
against Cuba without achieving the desired results. 
Unfortunately, predicting the success of sanctions is 
extremely difficult. "The historical record shows that the 
effects of sanctions are unpredictable and indiscriminate: 
even if they produce their intended adverse economic 
effects, the desired political effects do not automatically 
follow." Even so, economic sanctions have been used 
increasingly as tools of foreign policy. One recent study 
came to the conclusion that only a third of the sanctions 
imposed have been successful . 17 
According to Looney and Knouse, the outcome of any 
sanction episode depends on three elements: 1) the 
objectives or goals of the sanctions; 2) the definition of 
success; and 3) the methods used to implement the 
sanctions. 18 As stated previously, the objective of the 
U.S. sanctions against Cuba is the destabilization of 
Castro's regime. As for the definition of success, "the 
success of an economic episode as viewed from the 
perspective of the sender country has two parts: the extent 
16Hufbauer, pp. 65-66. 
17Looney, pp. 40-41. 
11Looney, p. 43. 
14 
to which the policy outcome sought by the sender country was 
in fact achieved, and the contribution made by sanctions to 
a positive outcome." However, one problem with determining 
the policy outcome sought by the sender is that usually the 
only way to determine it is by examining public statements 
made by the sender government. This creates a problem 
because the goal publicly announced by the government may 
not be the goal actually intended. It is also possible that 
the goal may change over time. Methods of implementation 
have been discussed previously (financial and trade 
sanctions), however, there are several additional points 
that can be mentioned. Since sanctions must be announced 
publicly, the target government may find it difficult to 
comply with the objectives of the sanctions without losing 
face. This could be very important to the target 
government. After all, if it acquires the reputation for 
giving in to pressure applied from the outside, they may 
believe that they will be looked on as weak. As a result, 
it is not unusual for there to be a stiffening of public 
resistance and resolve in the target state after the 
imposition of sanctions. This is one reason why sanctions 
fail. 19 These two factors can be seen in action in Cuba. 
Castro is a very proud man who would most surely see it as a 
sign of weakness to succumb to the pressures imposed on Cuba 
by the United States. Increased public resistance and 
19 Looney, pp. 45-46. 
15 
resolve can also be seen at work in Cuba. Castro and his 
regime have worked very hard at appealing to and cultivating 
Cuban nationalism, and have been extremely successful. The 
United States is constantly portrayed as the evil 
imperialist country that is the cause of the economic 
hardships that are being felt in Cuba. 
Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott give nine simple 
recommendations or "commandments" for sender countries to 
help enable the success of sanctions. This section will 
analyze how well the U.S. embargo against Cuba follows these 
rules. 
1. "Don't bite off more than you can chew.": 
"At most there is a weak correlation between economic 
deprivation and political willingness to change." While the 
economic impact of sanctions may be strongly felt by both 
the sender and the target, other factors may have a stronger 
effect than the sanctions in influencing the political 
outcome. Sanctions are rarely effective in leading to major 
policy changes in the target country. 20 This is true so 
far in Cuba. Cuba is currently experiencing severe economic 
hardships. However, Castro has been able to maintain 
political control through repression of the population and 
control over political and military elites. 
20Hufbauer, pp. 94-95. 
16 
2. "More is not necessarily merrier.": 
In fact, the greater the number of allies needed to 
implement sanctions, the less chance there is that they will 
succeed. When a sender believes he needs the help of 
allies, it may be that the desired goals are too ambitious. 
If the goals are modest, then the help of allies is not 
needed. Also, when it appears that a large number of 
countries is ganging up on a target country, the situation 
may backfire on the senders when another country (called a 
black knight) or group of countries comes to the aid of the 
target. 21 This was the case for Cuba during the Cold War. 
The Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries came to Cuba's 
aid by extending trade, and military and economic aid. They 
saw an excellent opportunity to make a friend in the Western 
Hemisphere who would give them military bases near the 
United States and a foothold in the hemisphere. Exports 
from Cuba to the socialist countries jumped from $2 million 
in 1959 (2 percent of total exports), to $150 million in 
1960 (24 percent), to $458 million in 1961 (73 percent). 
Imports from the socialist countries soared from $2 million 
in 1959 (.30 percent) to $119 million in 1960 (19 percent), 
to $492 in 1961 (70 percent). As for the United States, it 
supplied 70 percent of Cuba's total imports in 1958, 68 
percent in 1959, and only 4 percent in 1961. Total imports 
from Western countries decreased by 44 percent between 1957 
21Hufbauer, pp. 95-97. 
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and 1962. However, Canada, Mexico, and Western European 
countries continued their trade with Cuba after 1960. In 
the early 1970's several members of the OAS (Peru, 
Argentina, Jamaica, Guyana, and Barbados) reestablished 
trade with Cuba, violating the 1964 OAS imposed sanctions. 
Then in July of 1975, the OAS sanctions were lifted. 22 As 
can be seen, it is nearly impossible to enforce complete 
sanctions against a country. Even a country's allies and 
those who voted for the sanctions may end up breaking them. 
3. "Do pick on the weak and helpless": 
There appears to be a direct correlation between the 
economic and political health of the target country and its 
susceptibility to economic pressure. It only makes sense 
that countries under stress or undergoing significant 
problems would be much more likely to give in to coercion by 
the sender country. The health and stability of the target 
country are especially important when the goal of the 
sanctions is destabilization of the target government, where 
success is usually seen against weak governments. Also, the 
target country is usually much smaller than the sender. 
Therefore, although sanctions usually only involve a small 
percentage of the trade or financial flows of the sender 
country, they are able to affect the target country 
significantly. For cases involving the goal of 
22Hufbauer, pp. 199-201. 
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destabilization, the average GNP ratio is greater than 400 
(sender : target). The GNP ratio for the United States to 
Cuba is 173. This would give it a 43 percent chance of 
success, according to Hufbauer, et al. However, relative 
size is only a necessary, not a sufficient condition for the 
success of sanctions. More important factors for success 
are the extent of trade linkage, the economic effect of 
sanctions, and the warmth of r~lations between the sender 
country and the target prior to the initiation of 
sanctions. 23 It is also important in considering Cuba to 
remember that there is a strong regime in power. 
4. "Attack your allies, not your adversaries": 
Sanctions are more effective when used against friendly 
nations and close trading partners t;·;.an when used against 
unfriendly nations or those with which the sender has little 
trade. This only makes sense since friends are usually more 
willing to change their behavior or policies than are 
enemies. They are also less likely to attract and accept 
help from an enemy of the sender (black knight). Of course, 
it is important to remember that allies may be alienated by 
sanctions, so it is important to consider the possible 
problems in future relations that may develop as a result. 
Cuba had a high level of trade linkage to the United States 
(47 percent) and therefore close relations prior to 
23Hufbauer, pp. 87, 97-99. 
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implementation of sanctions. 24 However, as was previously 
noted, the Soviet Union stepped in almost immediately to 
offset U.S. sanctions. 
5. Act quickly: 
Sanctions that are applied slowly or incrementally allow 
time for the target country to adapt to the sanctions and 
influence popular opinion, thus encouraging the development 
of nationalism. Also, public enthusiasm in the sender 
country may fade over a long period of time, making it 
difficult to continue to implement the sanctions. To make 
the situation worse, the target country is more likely to 
get help from another major power if sanctions are 
prolonged. 25 This was true in Cuba since it was able to 
get assistance from the Soviet Union shortly after the 
embargo was imposed. As stated before, th~ Soviet Union saw 
its chance to extend its influence in the Western Hemisphere 
by aiding Cuba, and took it. Cuba has also been able to 
mobilize its population and appeal to Cuban nationalism. 
The United States is portrayed as an imperialist devil, in 
fact, acting as an effective scapegoat for the nation's 
problems. 
24Hufbauer, pp. 87, 99-100. 
25Hufbauer, pp. 100-101. 
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6. "In for a penny, in for a pound" (Cost to target): 
Those cases that impose heavy costs on the target are 
usually successful. For successful sanctions, the average 
cost to the target country is 2.4 percent of GNP. Those 
that failed averaged only 1 percent of GNP, barely touching 
the economy of the target country. However, again, it is 
possible for the sanctions to attract the aid of a "black 
knight" (the black knight corollary) which may of~set any 
harm that might otherwise result to the target economy. In 
the case of Cuba, the actual cost to Cuba is $114 million or 
4.4 percent of GNP. This is greater than the 2.4 percent of 
GNP that is usually necessary for success. However, the 
sanctions against Cuba have been particularly unsuccessful, 
no doubt originally due to the role of the Soviet Union. 26 
7. "If you need to ask the price, you can't afford the 
yacht" (Cost to sender): 
The more costly it is for the sender country to impose 
sanctions, the less is the likelihood that they will 
succeed. Sender countries should take political as well as 
economic costs into consideration before applying sanctions. 
Sanctions should be designed so that particular domestic 
groups or firms are not unduly affected by the costs. For 
example, forcing companies to cancel existing contracts 
places an overly large part of the burden on those 
26Hufbauer, pp. 87, 101-102. 
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companies. This is called retroactive application. One way 
to alleviate the costs to these companies is for the 
government to compensate them for their unsold inventories. 
Application of financial sanctions (as opposed to trade 
sanctions) is usually the least costly to the sender. This 
includes restriction of aid, denial of credits, and freezing 
assets. These actions may still inhibit the target 
country's ability to conduct trade without the imposition of 
formal trade controls. Financial sanctions applied alone 
are usually more successful than when paired with trade 
sanctions. ~his is because when all three types of trade 
sanctions are applied, the goal may be too ambitious. 27 
The use of all three types of sanctions against Cuba may be 
an indication that the United States has bitten off more 
than it can chew in this instance. 
In the case of the u.s. embargo against Cuba, the cost 
to the United States is considered to be a 3 on a scale of 1 
to 4, where a 4 is rated as a major loss to the sender. A 
rating of 3 is considered a modest welfare loss to the 
sender. 28 
8. "Choose the right tool for the job": 
Economic sanctions are often used in combination with 
other measures against the target country. These measures 
27Hufbauer, pp. 102-104. 
28Hufbauer, p. 8 7 . 
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may include covert action, quasi-military measures, or 
regular military operations. These additional measures are 
used most frequently in instances aiming at destabilization 
and impairment of military potential. Usually these 
measures are not used until it is believed that sanctions 
are not working, or they are working too slowly. 29 The 
United States has used some of these measures against Cuba. 
The U.S. assistance provided to Cuban exiles in the Bay of 
Pigs invasion of Cuba was the most well known example, among 
others that failed. 
9. Consider carefully: 
It goes without saying that sender governments need to 
consider carefully the objectives and the method of 
implementation of sanctions before making the final decision 
to use them. They will need to be sure the goals are 
attainable, that they can inflict enough damage on the 
economy of the target country to get their attention, that 
imposition of sanctions will not prompt other countries to 
come to the target's aid, and that the costs to their own 
domestic economies and those of their allies is not too 
great. Unfortunately, these conditions are not met very 
often and the chances of success will be low. Also, even 
when sanctions seem to be the best or only action that may 
29Hufbauer, pp. 104-105. 
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be taken, it is still necessary to tailor the type of 
sanctions to the circumstances. 30 
I would take this rule one step further and say that 
once sanctions are actually imposed, the goals and costs of 
the sanctions should be reviewed periodically to determine 
whether the sanctions are successful. If they are not being 
successful, then perhaps they need to be readjusted or 
dropped altogether. It cannot be automatically assumed that 
the sanctions will eventually achieve success if they are 
just continued long enough. Indeed, in the case of Cuba, 
they have been shown to be a failure. Thus, the question 
must be addressed: should they be continued? I believe it 
is now time to reconsider the U.S. embargo against Cuba for 
this reason. Perhaps it is time to formulate and implement 
new policies with regard to Cuba. 
Table 1 summarizes these "commandments" and their 
application to the U.S. embargo against Cuba, when the 
sanctions were first implemented back in 1961, and now in 
1994. While the application of the rules was somewhat more 
positive in 1961, and indeed, it may very well have been the 
only viable alternative at the time, as can be seen from the 
table, the sanctions now have fewer positive aspects. 
30Hufbauer, p. 105. 
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APPLICATION OF "COMMANDMENTS" TO CUBA 
1. Don't bite off more than 
you can chew 
2. More is not necessarily 
merrier 
3. Do pick on the weak and 
helpless 
4. Attack your allies not 
your adversaries 
5. Act quickly 
6. Cost to target 
7. Cost to sender 
8. Choose the right tool 
for the job 













To conclude this section, I would like to use Looney and 
Knouse's definition of a successful sanction episode to 
analyze the success of the embargo against Cuba. First, to 
what extent has the policy outcome sought by the United 
States been achieved; and second, what contribution have the 
imposed sanctions made to any positive outcome. Remember, 
25 
the ultimate goal of the sanctions is to destabilize 
Castro's regime and remove him from power. This objective 
has not yet been met. Castro has been able to maintain his 
control of the country. Economically, although the United 
States and Cuba had a high level of trade linkage before 
sanctions were imposed and the loss of this trade should 
have seriously damaged Cuba, the Soviet Union quickly jumped 
in to fill in the resulting gap. Even so, Cuba lost more 
than 4.4 percent of its GNP, an amount normally high enough 
to lead to the success of sanctions. However, even with the 
addition of military measures, such as the unsuccessful Bay 
of Pigs incident, Castro still retains firm control of the 
country. The following section will take a closer look at 
the economic and political situation in Cuba and how Castro 
is able to maintain his power even in the face of sanctions 
and economic hardship. 
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IV. RESULTS OF THE EMBARGO 
A. Economic Effects of the Embargo in CUba 
There is no doubt that the u.s. embargo against Cuba is 
hurting Cuba economically, especially since the fall of its 
previous sponsor, the Soviet Union. However, it is 
difficult to decipher and compare the Cuban economy with 
western economies because as with all socialist economies, 
they use different methods to measure aspects of their 
economy. For instance, Cuba uses the measure gross social 
product (GSP) instead of gross national product (GNP) as 
western nations do. They can only be compared by rough 
approximation. The Cuban regime, as all socialist 
governments, is intimately involved in its country's 
economic affairs. As of 1989, it controlled 90 percent of 
all land and 100 percent of all the business in the country, 
including: industry, banking, communications, 
transportation, and education. 31 
Cuba's economy has traditionally been extremely 
dependent on a single crop- sugar. Even with Cuba's efforts 
to diversify its agricultural sector, sugar has accounted 
for more than 80 percent of its exports. At one time, the 
Soviet Union was willing to buy this sugar at extremely 
31Michael J. Mazarr, "Prospects For Revolution in Post-Castro 
Cuba," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 31, lb. 
4 (1989), p. 63. 
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inflated prices- 5 to 6 times the market price. 32 However, 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and the 
Eastern bloc countries are no longer willing or able to pay 
such exorbitant prices to Cuba for a commodity they can get 
much cheaper on the open market. With the fall of 
communism, Cuba is no longer considered a strategic position 
by the former Soviet Union because it no longer needs or can 
afford an ally or a location for its bases in the Western 
Hemisphere. 
In addition, Cuba's economy is very inefficient at both 
the macro and micro levels. There have been many large 
scale failures since 1960, of industrial and agricultural 
projects that have been undertaken by the government. 
Examples include large highways that lead out of the 
capital, Havana, that carry very little traffic. Also, crop 
diversification experiments that not only have not been 
successful, but have actually disrupted other sectors of the 
economy. Many of these projects have been hindered by a 
lack of crucial components or labor, or a combination of 
both. 33 
In 1990, Castro declared a "Special Period in Time of 
Peace" which imposed increased austerity and rationing. 34 
nMazarr, p. 64. 
33Mazarr, p. 64. 
34Edward Gonzalez and David Ronfeldt, Cuba Adrift in a 
Postcommunist World (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), p. v. 
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By August 1990, petroleum rationing had been imposed, 
reducing daily gas and fuel deliveries by 50 percent in the 
state sector, and 30 percent in the private sector. 
Household electrical consumption was cut. Factories reduced 
their operating hours. According to Schulz, Cuba "was 
entering an era of spiraling underdevelopment" and was 
"experiencing substantial de-industrialization."n While 
the reduced oil deliveries from the Soviet Union were the 
catalyst for Cuba's economic downturn, the main reason for 
the crisis was the downfall of communism in the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe. Perestroika began to disrupt Soviet-
Cuban trade in the second half of 1989. Since Soviet 
companies were allowed to trade directly in the foreign 
market, they preferred to sell to customers who could pay 
cash rather than to countries like Cuba. Also, during 1989 
and 1990, Cuba lost 50 percent of its exports to Eastern 
bloc countries and its Soviet sugar subsidies. Even worse, 
the price of sugar on the world market dropped 
substantially. In December 1990, the Soviet subsidy was cut 
altogether, and they insisted that Cuba settle its debts. 3 ' 
Obviously, Cuba paid a high price for its primarily monocrop 
sugar economy. 
35Donald E. Schulz, "Can Castro Survive?," Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 35, No. 1 (1993), pp. 90-
92. 
36Schulz, "Can Castro Survive?," pp. 90-92. 
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Previously, the Soviet Union had allowed Cuba to run up 
a continuous merchandise trade deficit which grew to an 
enormous $23.5 billion by 1990, according to former Soviet 
Prime Minister Ryzkov. This amount was later verified by 
officials in Havana. When asked whether he thought the debt 
would be forgiven, a high-ranking Cuban official answered, 
"I don't know if they will forgive the debt, but we're not 
going to pay it. 1137 
In 1991, Cuba had expected to import 10 million metric 
tons of oil from the Soviet Union, 3 million metric tons 
less than the amount received in 1989. However, in reality, 
it received only 8.6 million metric tons. Cuba's imports 
from the Soviet Union dropped from $5.823 billion in 1990, 
to $1.673 billion in 1991, a drop of 71 percent. 38 By the 
Fall of 1991, Cuba was importing only 50 percent of the 
Soviet and Eastern European goods it had imported only two 
years earlier. 39 
In 1992, the condition worsened. In July 1992, Russia 
stopped all petroleum shipments to Cuba. Russian oil 
production had decreased by 35 percent. Deliveries to the 
Ukraine and Belarus took priority. In addition, Russians 
cut back on their imports of Cuban sugar because of the 
37A. R. M. Ritter, "The Cuban Economy in the 1990's: External 
Challenges and Policy Imperatives," Journal of Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs, 32, No. 3 (1990), pp. 124-125. 
31Gonzalez, p. v. 
39Schulz, "Can Castro Survive?," p. 92. 
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extremely high prices of basic necessities. Unfortunately, 
Cuba did not have the hard currency necessary to establish 
the new trading partners it needed to improve its economy. 
Finally, in November 1992, Cuba negotiated a deal with 
Russia to trade one million tons of sugar for 1.6 million 
tons of crude oil. 40 Gasoline rationing was tightened 
drastically. Public transportation was cut back. Cars, 
buses, trucks, and tractors were being replaced by bicycles 
and draft animals. Most consumer goods and food were added 
to the rationing program. Even with large-scale labor 
mobilization in rural areas, Cuba was expected to produce 
only 30 to 40 percent of the food that it had previously 
imported. 41 In early September 1992, Castro announced that 
Cuba had lost $4.7 billion a year in direct losses due to 
the low sugar prices, rising cost of imports, and loss of 
credits, among other factors. It had lost another billion 
dollars in indirect losses due to destabilization of 
supplies, export production problems, and unspecified 
financial problems. Altogether, Cuba suffered $5.7 billion 
in losses in 1992. Cuba was also forced to discontinue its 
work on the Juragua nuclear power plant due to economic 
conditions. It was unable to meet Russia's demands for the 
$200 million in cash and the $300,000 monthly payroll for 
technicians necessary to complete the project. This was a 
40Schulz, "Can Castro Survive?," pp. 92-93. 
41Gonzalez, pp. v-vi. 
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great blow to Cuba since it had already sunk $1.1 billion in 
the project and it had been counting on the plant to help 
get them out of their economic difficulties by solving their 
energy crisis and therefore largely reducing Cuba's 
dependency on oil imports. 42 
At the end of 1992, Carlos Lage, the government's 
leading economic planner, announced that since 1989, Cuba's 
net import capacity had dropped from $8.1 billion to $2.2 
billion in 1992. Also, over 75 percent of Cuba's markets 
and 73 percent of its import resources had been lost. Trade 
with the countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe dropped to only 7 percent ($830 million) of what it 
had been previously. The government's food program was not 
sufficient to meet the population's needs due to sharp 
decreases in the imports of fertilizer, herbicide, 
chemicals, and animal feed. The gross domestic product 
(GOP) decreased by between 34 and 51 percent. 43 
Beginning in July 1993, Castro was forced to begin 
opening up the economy to make up for the loss of Soviet 
imports it has experienced. These changes include 
legalizing the dollar, granting increased autonomy to 
farmers, and allowing people in more than 135 small-scale 
occupations to work for themselves. However, these people 
must first be cleared by the Ministry of the Interior before 
42Schulz, "Can Castro Survive?," pp. 94-95. 
43Schulz, pp. 95-96. 
32 
obtaining a license, and professionals- that is anyone 
holding a college degree- are barred from self-employment. 
Also, farmers who sell their own vegetables privately do not 
set their own price- that is still done by the local 
cooperative. 44 
There are many examples of these new small businesses, 
some legal, some illegal. For example, Pablo Lazo is a 
black market cab driver in Havana who is an unemployed 
economist,. and who gives out his father's business card 
along with his own. His father is a doctor at the local 
clinic who also makes private house calls on the side. Not 
long ago, these black market services would have landed the 
would be entrepreneur in jail. However, things are changing 
as Cuba's crisis deepens. As Lazo says, "The state can't 
pay for anything anymore. That's why they let us work for 
ourselves." According to one author, "few Cubans fear a 
backlash from communist hard-liners" for this black market 
activity. Much of the bureaucracy itself has been 
infiltrated by capitalism. The military's constructing 
companies have been building new tourist hotels, while the 
Ministry of Agricult11re is pursuing fruit canning 
partnerships. The government knows it needs dollars to 
survive and realizes that only economic liberalization can 
provide them. 45 
44McGeary, p. 45. 
45Millman, pp. 66-68. 
33 
One problem being faced by these resourceful 
entrepreneurs, the legal ones, is that it is still illegal 
for one Cuban to hire another Cuban. This is considered 
exploitation. However, this does not deter them. For 
example, an owner of a motor and automobile repair shop has 
three helpers, all trained mechanics that have been 
discharged from government motor pools. Since they cannot 
get licenses as employees, but only as owners, the shop 
owner got around the problem by legally establishing a 
cooperative. The "co-owners" then pay the original owner a 
portion of their earnings as rent on equipment. This has 
been a lucrative enterprise since there are many old and 
worn out items in need of repair in Cuba. Instead of 
repressing these new entrepreneurs, the government is 
reportedly disappointed by the small numbers {less than 
50,000) and would actually like to encourage them. This is 
because unemployment has been rising in Cuba, and is 
currently widespread. The regime is becoming concerned, and 
it is hoped that self employment in small businesses will 
help counteract this trend. In the future, optimists even 
hope that Cubans may be able to hire and fire their own 
employees. 46 
To help improve the situation, Cuba has instituted new 
economic policies. Tre state still controls the internal 
economy and sugar sector for the most part. However, the 
46Millman, p. 68. 
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external sector is turning to foreign investors for help in 
joint enterprises in petroleum, tourism, biotechnology, and 
other selected areas. Since there have been no significant 
oil discoveries, Cuba is depending on tourism and 
biotechnology to pull them out of their decline. These 
joint ventures have been financed primarily by West European 
investors, mainly Span~sh, but also French, British, and 
Scandinavian companies. Canadian, Brazilian, and Mexican 
firms are also being courted. Previously, the foreign 
partner was limited to 49 percent participation, however, 
Cuba is now allowing foreigners majority investment in 
certain cases. "Joint ventures or other economic 
arrangements (such as debt equity swaps) are permitted where 
the Cuban state enterprise needs access to the capital, 
technology, and marketing network of a foreign investor to 
develop a new industry." The foreign partner is allowed to 
send its share of the profits overseas, appoint its own 
management, and hire Cuban workers from a pool of selected 
workers. Land ownership is not allowed, but long-term 
leases are granted to foreign investors. The expansion of 
the tourist and biotechnology industries are seen as short-
to medium-term solutions to Cuba's economic problems, while 
the possible discovery of offshore oil fields is seen as a 
long-term solution. 47 However, some experts do not believe 
these joint ventures will do much to improve Cuba's economic 
47Gonzalez, pp. vi, 23-24. 
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situation. It will be very difficult for Cuba to break into 
a market that is already dominated by huge multinational 
corporations, especially given its lack of experience.•• 
When Cuba eliminated virtually all small businesses, it lost 
a huge amount of human capital. These entrepreneurs had 
developed management skills, technical knowledge, and 
marketing expertise. Most of these people were assimilated 
into the hierarchical bureaucratic structure that remains in 
Cuba today.•9 Others simply fled the country, with the 
vast majority now living in the United States. 
Another scheme for the regime to obtain dollars, now 
that it is legal for Cuban citizens to hold them, was to 
open the government's hard currency stores or diplotiendas 
in July 1993, to any Cuban citizen able to pay for 
merchandise with dollars. Previously, these stores had been 
open only to tourists, diplomats, and individuals with ties 
to the party. These dollar stores have been a big success, 
with dozens of new ones opening since last summer. Most of 
these shops have been opened in the residential barrios 
where there may be huge lines of people waiting to buy 
foreign products. One company, Commercial Cimex, S.A., has 
opened 4 dollar stores in Miramar. It is a 50-50 joint 
venture between Mexican and Cuban investors. One of the 
stores averages 3,000 to 4,000 customers per day with sales 
uSchulz, "Can Castro Survive?," p. 94. 
49 Ri tter, p. 123. 
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of about $15 per customer. The company expects to do $70 
million worth of business this year. In addition to 
providing a one percent tax on the stores' gross sales, 
these stores also encourage new enterprises in the local 
neighborhoods, such as: black market taxis, "valet parking" 
for bicycles, and food vendors. 50 
Still, businessmen in Cuba have a lot to learn. After 
decades of communist dictatorship, they must relearn the 
language and strategies of capitalism in order to succeed in 
their joint ventures. Liberalizing their investment rules 
to allow 51 percent for Cuba and 49 percent for the foreign 
investor, as they have done, should help bring in some 
foreign expertise to help teach them. Also, foreign 
companies can send as much of the profits out of Cuba as 
they want, as long as they open dollar accounts at Cuban-
owned banks. Companies are also allowed to subcontract 
goods and services from abroad. Examples of new joint 
ventures are a British firm working with the state oil 
monopoly to contract for excess refining capacity to process 
lubricants to sell in the Caribbean; an Israeli company 
investing $22 million in Cuban agriculture to grow 
grapefruit to sell in Europe; and a Canadian company 
joining with Cuba's Ministry of Basic Industry in a joint 
venture for mineral exploration, specifically gold, 
investing about $1.5 million. According to one corporate 
50Millman, pp. 67-68. 
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executive, "The signal I receive is the Cubans are open for 
business. They don't want taxes and regulations to impede 
business, they want investment." 51 
While it is difficult to determine precisely how much of 
an effect sanctions have had on the Cuban economy, they have 
.1ad an effect. According to Hufbauer, "the embargo has been 
quite economically damaging." He concludes that the impact 
of the sanctions has been a 2 percent reduction of growth 
per year. The annual economic costs to Cuba when it was 
still on friendly terms with the Soviet Union and Eastern 
bloc have been calculated. There has been $25 million in 
increased shipping costs due to the necessary diversion of 
trade since it can no longer trade with the United States 
which was an extremely close (in terms of both physical 
distance and warmth of relations) trading partner. It also 
experienced a reduction in purchasing power since there was 
a shift in trade to countries with nonconvertible 
currencies. This loss was estimated to be 30 percent of the 
total trade with these countries for a total of $341 
million. This adds up to a total loss of $366 million per 
year. Even with compensatory aid from the Soviet Union of 
$252 million per year, there was still a loss of $114 
million per year to Cuba. 52 Unfortunately for Cuba, the 
51
"Cuba Learns," p. 68. 
52Hufbauer, pp. 201-202. 
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Soviet Union is no longer around to help offset the cost of 
sanctions, so the situation has only gotten worse. 
However, while the embargo has damaged Cuba's economy 
rather badly, "its political results, on the other hand, 
have been questionable." Others have called the sanctions 
an outright failure. The policy result of the sanctions 
were rated as a 1 on a scale of 1 (failed) to 4 (success). 
The contribution of sanctions was ranked as a 1 on a scale 
of 1 (none) to 4 (significant). And finally, the success 
score of the sanctions was ranked as a 1 on a scale of 1 
(outright failure) to 16 (significant success). If 
anything, "the embargo may have exerted a counterproductive 
effect on Castro, and may have helped consolidate his 
position in Cuba."!;3 
With these facts in mind, the next section will examine 
the methods Castro and his regime have used to maintain 
their power in Cuba. 
B. Political Effects of the Embargo in Cuba: Is it 
Obtaining the Desired Results? 
1. Coup from Below? 
Obviously, as discussed in the previous section, 
Cuba is experiencing enormous economic difficulties due to 
the U.S. embargo and the loss of its previous Soviet 
support. But are the economic deprivations having the 
desired effect of weakening and destabilizing the Cuban 
!; 3Hufbauer, pp. 202-203. 
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government and encouraging the Cuban people to overthrow 
Castro and his regime? Or is the embargo simply a relic of 
the Cold War continued for political and moral reasons to 
teach Castro and Cuba a lesson? 
Even with the extreme economic hardships that Cuba 
is currently experiencing, Fidel Castro still seems to have 
a strong grip over Cuba. However, there is some evidence of 
dissent. According to Gonzalez, certain sectors of Cuban 
society are experiencing "increased political alienation, 
discontent, and criticism," and people have been questioning 
issues that were formerly taken for granted. As evidence of 
this dissent he cites Cuba's increasing crime rate as 
reported by both the Cuban government and the foreign media. 
These include black marketing and other forbidden capitalist 
activities as well as violent crimes. Human rights and 
dissident groups have also been on the rise.~4 
Much of this tension, crime, and dissident activity 
may be traced to the hardships caused by the economic 
crisis. Basic needs, such as free education, health 
services, day care, food, low cost housing, public 
transportation, and clothing, have been reduced and 
rationed. Inequities between political and social classes 
are increasing. Government and party officials, and state 
supported scientists, artists, and writers enjoy special 
privileges to which the rest of the population has no 
54Gonzalez, pp. 10-11. 
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access. Tensions are also seen between young and old. 
While a majority of the older generation, including the 
revolutionary leadership, may support Castro's policies, the 
younger generation, born after Castro came to power, and who 
make up 60 percent of the population, are typically 
apolitical, reject Cuba's austere society, and are otherwise 
opposed to many of the values and ideas of the older 
generation. Juvenile delinquency has increased and student 
protests and anti-Castro activities took place in 1990 and 
1991. Most of the people fleeing Cuba by boat to Florida 
are young men, and this number has increased from 26 in 
1986, to over 2200 in 1991, an increase of almost 8500 
percent in 5 years. 55 Of course, for Castro this can be 
seen as a relief valve that can help ease some of the 
pressure within Cuba. This exodus of dissatisfied young men 
who are leaving the country means that fewer dissenters and 
political opposition leaders actually remain in Cuba. It 
would actually be to his advantage to allow these people to 
leave the country without hindering them. 
Despite the fact that times are tough in Cuba and 
popular discontent is on the increase, it seems unlikely 
that the regime will weaken to the point of collapse in the 
near future. Castro has several means at his disposal to 
keep the population under control. One method is 
repression. The Ministry of Interior has set up "rapid-
55Gonzalez, pp. 11-13. 
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reaction brigades," made up of civilian supporters of the 
regime. These groups take mob action against regime critics 
and opposition. They also encourage the participation of 
the general population in these acts of repudiation against 
dissenters. Several of these incidents have been well 
publicized, especially an act of physical assault against 
Maria Elena Cruz Varela, a dissident poet, in November 1991, 
and a later incident against Elizardo Sanchez Santa Cruz, a 
famous human rights activist who was trapped in his house 
for 15 hours by a violent mob. The mob acting against 
Sanchez was actually under the direction of the police. 
These occurrences were not covered up by the authorities. 
One ca~ only infer that they want the public to know about 
these incidents in order to keep opposition under 
control. 56 This government activity of harassing and 
beating dissidents and vandalizing their homes has been 
verified by an Americas Watch report. 57 Castro and his 
regime are obviously more than willing to use repression 
against dissidents and this has led to the fact that there 
is very little resistance to his regime. 58 However, the 
regime does try to make these crackdowns against dissidents 
56 Gonzalez, pp. 13-14. 
57Martin McReynolds, "Report: Rights Suffered in 1 92 1 , " Miami 
Herald, 14 Dec. 1992, sec. A, p. 12. Abstract in Info-South. 
University of Miami: North-South Center. 
58Luis Aguilar Leon, "Some Are Viewing Castro through a 
Favorable Glass," Miami Herald, 6 Aug. 1993, sec. A, p. 10. 
Abstract in Info-South. University of Miami: North-South Center. 
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appear to be the consequence of the popular will, indicating 
that Castro himself does not want to be seen as directly 
responsible for the repression. Also, under the Cuban 
constitution, individual rights are subordinated to the 
state59 , somewhat legitimizing government repression. 
The Cuban security apparatus itself has been 
strengthened in recent years through purging of those 
considered to be a threat to the current regime. This 
security apparatus has been able to infiltrate and in effect 
neutralize society and the politico-military institutions of 
the state of which it is a part. As a result, it has been 
able to put down dissent more effectively, preventing the 
forging of an organized opposition. The fact that no 
autonomous opposition group has been able to form within 
Cuba decreases the likelihood of change occurring. 60 
Without an effective opposition group (counter-state) being 
formed, there is no real alternative to the state. As long 
as there is no strong link between the opposition (counter-
state) and society, the state will be able to maintain 
control over society. 61 
59 Rolando P. Paez, "Lift the u.S. Embargo- and Force Castro's 
Bloody Hand," Miami Herald, 29 Jan. 1993, sec. A, p. 15. Abstract 
in Info-South. University of Miami: North-South Center. 
60Schulz, "Can Castro Survive?, " p. 97. 
61Gordon H. McCormick, Class Notes, National Security Affairs 
3800, The Theory and Practice of Social Revolution, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1 Nov. 1993. 
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----------- --
The military itself, the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
(FAR), is an organization that was professionalized with 
Soviet help and has proven its efficiency in combat 
overseas. Its leaders remain loyal to Fidel and Raul Castro 
and are subordinated to civilian authority. This loyalty 
was strengthened by the trial in June 1989, of Arnalda 
Ochoa, who was Cuba's most decorated combat soldier and a 
"Hero of the Republic." Ochoa was charged with high treason 
for engaging in drug trafficking as well as corruption and 
other serious offenses. According to Gonzalez, this trial 
was advantageous to the regime for several reasons: 1) it 
covered up the government's involvement in drug operations 
that had dated back to 1980; 2) it got rid of a potential 
source of trouble or opposition- perhaps even an eventual 
coup plotter; and 3) "it reaffirmed the Castro brothers' 
authority over the military, demonstrating the FAR's loyalty 
and obedience to Fidel and Raul even when it came to 
approving maximum punishment for one of its own. "62 It 
also served as an obvious example that no opposition against 
the government would be tolerated. If even a "Hero of the 
Republic" is not safe from retribution, no one, military or 
civilian, is beyond the reach of the omnipresent and 
unforgiving government. 63 Given the historic frequency of 
military coups in the rest of Latin America, this control 
62Gonzalez, pp. 16-17. 
63Schulz, "Can Castro Survive?", p. 100. 
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over the military and its loyalty to the regime is obviously 
extremely important, and has surely been a significant 
factor in the longevity and stability of Castro's regime in 
Cuba. 
Besides the mobilization of "defense brigades" to 
control the population, the regime has traditionally put a 
high priority on mobilization of the population, even before 
the current crisis. Mobilization has been used to send 
urbanites to the countryside to help in agricultural 
efforts; to help fight black marketing; and to help build 
defensive structures to defend them against the U.S. attack 
that Castro continues to warn them about. The strategy is 
to keep the people busy and under close supervision, so that 
they will be "unlikely to have the time, energy, opportunity 
or courage to engage in anti-regime behavior." 64 
Surveillance of the population has also played a key 
role in deterring organized opposition to the regime. In 
order for people to join opposition groups and participate 
in their activities, there must be an element of trust 
involved. However, the security apparatus has intertwined 
itself so tightly with the state and society that it is 
difficult for people to know who to trust. There have been 
rumors that the president, and two additional members of the 
Cuban Democratic Coalition, an opposition group aligned with 
the Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF), were working 
64Schulz, "Can Castro Survive?", p. 98. 
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with the police. This suggests to the populace that there 
is no one who can be trusted. Anyone could be an agent for 
the government. Even if the rumors are not true, it 
suggests that the security apparatus is able to disseminate 
disinformation to such an extent that people believe it 
enough to increase their distrust. Either way, this will 
keep new members from joining the group and persuade current 
members to leave the group. Many people in Cuba have become 
used to hiding their true feelings about the regime, showing 
instead their outward support for it. They are not willing 
to accept the serious consequences incurred by opposing the 
regime. These consequences are often very serious, 
including: physical abuse, harassment, imprisonment, and 
loss of food rations, employment, or housing. Increasingly, 
opposition leaders are being tried and given quite lengthy 
sentences. 65 
Currently, many Cubans do not even trust their own 
neighbors. It is not uncommon for neighbors to give reports 
on each other to the local block committee, especially about 
those who do not conform. Reportable offenses range from 
religious observance to economic offenses to criticism of 
the regime. The government keeps dossiers on all Cubans 
that record these offenses and follow them throughout their 
life. 66 
nschulz, "Can Castro Survive?," pp. 98-99. 
"McGeary, pp. 42-52. 
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Although by 1992, 50 human rights and dissident groups 
had formed (20 dealing with human rights and 30 with 
strictly political intentions), most are calling for 
peaceful change through fr~e elections or internal reform of 
the regime. These groups do not currently pose much of a 
threat because they remain small, fragmented, and highly 
individualized. Some may even be under the control of the 
regime itself. In order to become effective, these group~ 
must take collective action that is very difficult under the 
cu~rent repressive conditions. Individuals are fearful of 
taking opposin~ action alone, preferring to wait until 
others take action since there is strength in numbers. This 
is more likely to happ.i!n if they see that the government is 
collapsing, or there is no other alternative to the current 
regime. CasLro and his government are still able to wield 
enough power to repress these dissident groups, perhaps 
seeking to avoid an incident like Tiananrnen Square in Cuba. 
They especially target those groups that have broad appeal 
to both the masses and the elites, such as those with a 
social democratic orientation, and are more lenient with 
those with close ties to the conservative exiles in 
Miami. 67 This makes sense, since most of the general 
population is not likely to be drawn to groups that are 
allied with the Cuban exiles because the exiles are seen as 
having fled the situation and therefore are not seen as 
67 Gonzalez, pp. 34-36. 
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having a right or the legitimacy to involve themselves in 
Cuban politics. 
Yet another reason for the difficulty in organizing 
opposition to the regime is that there is no strong 
institution in which dissidents can take sanctuary while 
carrying out their activities. This situation is unlike the 
situation in Poland, for example, where the Roman Catholic 
Church is very strong and where the labor union, Solidarity, 
was able to mobilize people against the government. 61 It 
is also unlike the situation in much of Latin America in the 
past, such as Nicaragua, where the Catholic Church played an 
important role in opposition to the government through their 
application of liberation theology. This type of 
institutional leadership is markedly absent in Cuba due to 
the regime's control, repression, and infiltration of these 
groups. 
While the government discourages opposition groups, 
at least one author believes that the regime actually 
encourages a certain amount of criticism of the regime and 
government policy, especially in terms of exposing 
mismanagement and corruption. The government has allowed 
local governments to relay these grievances and complaints 
to the central government. This has acted as another 
"Schulz, "Can Castro Survive?," p. 99. 
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important safety valve for the government. 69 While this 
may be true to some extent, it also seems that the regime is 
willing to tolerate only a certain low level of criticism, 
as can be seen by the existence and activities of the rapid-
reaction brigades and other repressive measures. 
Another major tool that Castro uses extremely well 
to maintain his power is nationalism. He has successfully 
linked this with anti-U.S. rhetoric and propaganda70 , 
making the U.S. in effect a scapegoat. The U.S. embargo is 
blamed for the country's current economic crisis. Cuba sees 
itself as David, and the United States as Goliath trying to 
starve them into getting rid of Castro. Castro has been 
able to use this argument to gain support for the "special 
period" that has been declared. 71 This nationalism serves 
Castro well in unifying the country against what is seen as 
a common enemy of Cuba. 
After the revolution, the elite and middle class 
were stripped of their influence, prestige, and property. 
They abhorred Castro's socialist changes and many fled the 
country to the United States, where they still use their 
influence with the U.S. government to try to bring down 
69 Jorge I. Dominguez, "The Secrets of Castro's Staying Power," 
Foreign Affairs, 72, No. 2 (1993), pp. 97-98. 
70Mark Falcoff, "Is Cuba Next?," Commentary, 94, No. 5, (1992). 
Abstract in Info-South. University of Miami: North-South Center. 
71McGeary, p. 54. 
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Castro. 12 However, this flight of the country's elite 
meant that there were very few left within Cuba to oppose 
Castro. Those who did remain would understandably not be 
willing to express their opposition. After three decades 
there has yet to be a reemergence of this group that is 
willing to oppose Castro due to the severe repressive nature 
of the regime. 
Given these circumstances, a "revolution from below" 
by the masses seems unlikely. The regime holds too tight a 
rein over the population. People have become tired and 
demoralized. Many experience a "pervasive sense of 
powerlessness" and have accepted the fact that Castro may 
still be around for some time to come. 73 In some respects, 
this concurs with James Scott's Moral Economy of the Peasant 
theory. In this theory, peasants are unwilling to take 
unnecessary risks to improve their average income when it 
will jeopardize the amount of income they need to merely 
subsist. In other words, they prefer to take no action as 
long as they are able to subsist. 74 As one Western 
diplomat was quoted as saying recently, "a vast majority of 
the population is sitting and waiting until the situation is 
72 E. Bradford Burns, Latin America: A Concise Interpretive 
History, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 
1990), p. 285. 
73Schulz, "Can Castro Survive?," p. 102. 
74J c ames . Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion 
and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1976), passim. 
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resolved for them." A majority of the population does "not 
seem to care what kind of political system they have as long 
as they have an economy that works. " 75 Although currently 
Cuba's economy is definitely not working well, people are 
still managing to get by even though their quality of life 
has declined significantly. As long as Castro and his 
regime are able to exert their control through repression, 
mobilization, and nationalist rhetoric, they will remain in 
power. They are in effect, the only game in town since they 
have been able to squash nearly all opposition. With no 
strong, organized opposition group for the people to rally 
behind, the populace is left with essentially no other 
choice, but to submit to the government. To do otherwise is 
to risk almost certain harassment, imprisonment, or physical 
abuse. As one author states, "Castro's 'final hour' seems 
likely to last for several years, and perhaps, much 
longer. 1176 
2. Coup from the Top? 
Fidel Castro has held onto his power in Cuba since 
January 1959, over 35 years. This is quite remarkable, 
given the current economic situation in Cuba. This section 
will examine how Castro has been successfully able to 
maintain his power and avoid a coup from the top by both the 
75McGeary, p. 52. 
76Donald E. Schulz, "The United States and Cuba: From a 
Strategy of Conflict to Constructive Engagement," Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 35, No. 2 (1993), p. 81. 
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civilian and military elite for these past 35 years through 
control of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), and the 
military and security apparatus. 
a. T~Pu~ 
Castro's control of the Communist Party of Cuba 
(the Partido Comunista de Cuba, or PCC) is a key element of 
his hold over Cuban politics. This party was established by 
Castro in 1965. It is the last of three attempts to combine 
members of the 26 July Movement with the former orthodox 
Communist party, the Popular Socialist Party (PSP). Its 
organizational structure is patterned after the former 
Communist party in the Soviet Union. It is the only 
political party permitted in Cuba. Its membership is 
600,000 full and candidate members. Fidel Castro is the 
ranking member of the Political Bureau (Politburo) and the 
first secretary of the Party. Raul Castro is the second 
secretary of the party and second ranking member of the 
Politburo. The party consisted of a Central Committee with 
about 100 members, the Politburo with 13 members, and the 
Secretariat of 11 merabers. The party has been successful in 
mobilizing most of the population into its affiliated mass 
membership structures, such as the Committees for the 
Defense of the Revolution, and peasant, worker, and youth 
groups. ~~11 important executive posts are filled with party 
members. In the case of the National Assembly, about 90 
percent of the deputies are members of the party or its 
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affiliated mass organizations. Castro dominates the party, 
and most of its leaders were members of the 26 July 
Movement, not the old Communist party with which Castro had 
had some disagreements in the past. In fact, the first 
attempt at a new communist party was disbanded after its 
leader, Anibal Escalante, tried to supplant the members 
loyal to Castro with his orthodox members. However, since 
1968, the revolution has been firmly institutionalized and 
Castro has remained in control. 77 With this pervasive 
presence of the party in the government and Castro's strong 
control of the party, it would be difficult for a coup from 
above to take place. 
In October 1991, the Communist Party convened 
the Fourth Congress of the PCC. Many had seen this as a 
chance for major reform to begin to take place. However, 
instead of instituting changes in the system, such as 
democratization, instituting free markets, or privatization 
of t-'~e economy, it merely reaffirmed the existing order. 
Although it did not reinstitute the Peasant Free Market as 
many had hoped, it did approve the government's efforts to 
attract foreign technology and investment. The Congress 
also adopted important measures, such as personnel and 
organizational changes to help them avoid falling into the 
same trap that led to the fall of the Soviet Union. It got 
rid of the Party s~cretariat and its departments and 
77Rossi, p. 86. 
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transferred its remaining functions to other state and 
government organizations. The Central Committee of the 
party also underwent a substantial change in its membership, 
replacing about 60 percent of its members. New members were 
appointed to the Politburo, whose membership was increased 
to 25 members, with no alternates. There were several 
significant aspects of this turnover in the Politburo: 
1) several old fidelista and raulista supporters were not 
renamed; 2) three of the 15 new members are in their SO's, 
8 are in their 40's, and one is in his 30's. This means 
that almost half of the members are not members of Castro's 
generation; 3) Carlos Aldana was appointed to the 
Politburo, showing his increasing status in the party. (He 
was then subsequently sacked along with the party secretary 
and seven municipal secretaries responsible for production 
of food for Havana because he had dared to suggest political 
and economic reforms71 ). These changes effectively 
consolidated fidelista control of the regime. The 
transformed 25-member Politburo gained new policymaking 
authority since the Central Committee had been dissolved. 
It is significant that although most of the new members of 
the Politburo represent a younger generation, they are still 
fidelistas and therefore unlikely to differ with the regime 
on policy questions. It is also significant that most of 
71 John Hughes, "Castro' s Long Reign May End in Violence, " 
Christian Science Monitor, 1 Oct. 1992, p. 19. Abstract in Info-
South. University of Miami: North-South Center. 
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-them are virtually unknown and have no following or power 
base of their own. This would make it very difficult for 
them to institute any kind of coup attempt against the 
regime. Of further importance is the fact that the 
Politburo's new membership includes virtually no trained 
economists or technocrats. The only exception is one 79 
year old member who was trained in Marxist economics before 
the revolution. Several did not even go to college. Five 
of them are military members, the rest are party 
functionaries who have spent their careers in the various 
party organizations. Castro has surrounded himself with 
these hardline followers who are unlikely to broach any 
major economic or political reforms. The regime is 
returning to its 1960's view, emphasizing politically and 
ideologically driven solutions for its hurting economy. It 
is still following the old path of a command directed 
economy, mass mobilization of the population, and the forced 
austerity of the Special Period. 79 The party leader hip is 
closing ranks against any internal political or ideological 
division. This will help Castro to continue to consolidate 
and retain his power. 
Finally, government and party officials, and 
state supported scientists, artists, and writers enjoy 
special privileges to which the rest of the population has 
no access. Perhaps partly for this reason, the 
''Gonzalez, pp. 6-9. 
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revolutionary leadership support.-> .r:astro' s policies. 10 In 
addition, the continuation of the current regime is the 
elites' only guarantee of survival. If Castro topples, they 
will forfeit their privileges, power, and perhaps even their 
lives. This fact of life alone will keep most of them in 
line and working together to maintain the status quo. 11 
b. The MilitG..r~· ··nd Security Apparatus 
According to ~- __ English, in 1988 Cuba was 
probably the most completely militarized country in the 
world in terms of absolute numbers. The Cuban military 
ranks second only to Brazil in terms of numbers, compared to 
other Latin American countries, and at least in 1988, it was 
the best equipped in terms of military equipment, in the 
region. (This was before the fall of the Soviet Union, 
which supplied most of its equipment). However, the army 
has no strategic weapons, the Navy is for the most part 
relegated to coastal defense, and the Air Force's main role 
is as a fighter and tactical support force. In 1963, after 
the revolutionary regime had crushed the last remnants of 
armed internal opposition, it reimposed compulsory military 
service. Cuban military involvement outside the Western 
Hemisphere began back in the early 1960's and troops were 
sent to many countries throughout Africa. Cuban troops 
basically acted as a surrogate for the Soviet Union, in 
10Gonza1ez, p. 11. 
11 Schulz, "Can Castro Survive?", pp. 104-105. 
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return for which the Soviets supplied them with formidable 
military equipment. Military officers are given 
professional training at one of three schools, the General 
Antonio Maceo Interarms School for mechanized infantry, 
armored troops, logistic, and engineering troops, the 
General Jose Maceo Interarms School for motorized infantry, 
armored troops, artillery and engineer troops, or the 
General Carlos Roloff Communications and Chemical Troops 
School. Artillery officers receive advanced training at the 
Camilo Cienfuegos Artillery School. Courses are four or 
five years long depending on the curriculum, and lead to a 
degree in science or engineering. Company and field grade 
officers from all three services may take post-graduate 
courses at the Maximo Gomez Military Academy which provides 
training for potential staff officers. In the past, many 
officers also received post-graduate training in the Soviet 
Union. This regimen of deployment and professional training 
has transformed the Cuban military from a pre-revolutionary 
armed force that was singularly unimpressive among Latin 
American forces, to a formidable professional force 
providing an effective deterrent. 82 
Cuba's paramilitary forces are also fairly 
large, including: 15,000 National Revolutionary Police, 
3500 border troops, 1500 Ministry of the Interior Special 
82Adrian J. English, Regional Defence Profile No. 1: Latin 
America (London: Jane's Publishing Company Limited, 1988), 
pp. 122-138. 
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Troops, a 100,000 strong Labour Youth Army, and 500,000 in 
the Territorial Troop Militia. The Ministry of the Interior 
is in charge of all internal security in the country. 83 It 
is this ministry that is able to strike terror in the hearts 
of Cuban citizens since it is the one concerned with 
maintaining internal security and repressing any opposition 
to the regime. 
During the first 26 years of the revolution, it 
was difficult to distinguish between the responsibilities of 
civilian government officials and those of personnel in the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR). This was particularly 
true of the 1960's as the government tried to organize 
popular support and consolidate its power. Jorge Dominguez 
coined the term "civic soldier" to explain this type of 
civil-military relations. These civic soldiers were 
military members who administrated large sectors of military 
and civilian life. They were supposed to embody the 
ideology and traditim:. of the revolution, and were held up 
as examples to the rest of the population. Castro himself 
is a good example of this union of military and civilian 
roles and duties. 84 Even after 35 years, he continues to 
promote his image as a revolutionary war hero through the 
13English, p. 135. 
84Phyllis Greene Walker, "National Security," 
Country Study, ed. James D. Rudolph (Washington, DC: 
Studies, The American University, 1985), p. 246. 
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in Cuba: A 
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wearing of the uniform and constant references made to the 
revolution. While this dual mission on the part of the 
civic soldier- being involved in both civilian and military 
matters- diminished starting in 1973, due to Soviet 
influence and emphasis on professionalization and 
specialization,•~ the FAR has been getting involved again 
recently in civil matters, such as agriculture. 
Members of the military were also among the 
vanguard of the PCC. In 1970, almost 70 percent of all 
military officers were members of either the PCC, or the 
Union of Young Communists, its affiliated youth 
organization. The preponderance of military officers on the 
Central Committee of the PCC shows their importance in the 
party. Shortly after the founding of the party in 1965, the 
PCC organization was integrated into the FAR. The three 
services- the army, navy, and air force- each had its own 
political section. In order to be promoted, it was 
important to be a member of the PCC or the Union of Young 
Communists. The Party saw the FAR as a good place to 
indoctrinate nonparty members into communist ideology. 
Therefor2, education in Marxist-Leninist ideology was 
included as a part of basic military training.•' This 
close integration between the military and the party and its 
nwalker, p. 248. 
"Walker, p. 247. 
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ideology is another way Castro and his regime have been able 
to stay in power. 
Another example of the regime's quick action 
against potential reformers and criticizers, is that taken 
against Carlos Aldana, former Politburo member, and at one 
time, Cuba's premier bureaucrat. His liberal attitudes, 
such as a willingness to tolerate dissent, and his desire to 
permit more freedom for citizens wanting to travel abroad, 
got him relieved from his office. The charges against him 
were simply a pretext for removing him from office, even 
though this would not ordinarily be the case for minor 
charges such as these. His firing was meant as a warning 
for others wanting to change the regime. His removal was 
likely to influence other elites because "if even this 
'moderate' could be disgraced, no one was safe."17 
I agree with Schulz when he says that a golpe de 
estado is unlikely in Cuba in the near future. 88 Fidel 
Castro has maintained a strong grip on his power through his 
control of the civilian and military elite. He originally 
gained his control over both of these sectors during the 
revolution by using his charisma, intelligence, and cunning, 
as well as taking advantage of fate after the deaths of the 
revolution's other two leaders, Jose Antonio Echeverria and 
Frank Pais. Even at this early stage, both political and 
17Schulz, "Can Castro Survive?," pp. 104-105. 
18Schulz, "The United States and Cuba," p. 81. 
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military leaders were responsible to him. His brother Raul 
also gained loyal followers at this time and earned a 
reputation for his leadership, organizational skills, and 
his prompt, decisive action against those who opposed him or 
broke the rules. 
Castro also has firm control over the Party 
apparatus. He has centralized party power with himself as 
the head, and is bringing up a new generation of party 
leaders who are loyal to him. In addition, he has made sure 
that this new generation has not developed their own power 
base, making it more difficult for them to organize against 
him. 
The military with its compulsory service helps 
to indoctrinate the general population with communist 
ideology. The armed forces have had combat experience in 
Africa and earned a reputation as fighters. Military 
officers receive university and post-graduate level 
education at military academies. During the Cold War, some 
Cuban officers received professional education in the Soviet 
Union and Soviet advisors provided technical and military 
training for Cuba's armed forces. These factors helped to 
professionalize the military and the officer corps, helping 
to keep them loyal and under check. Castro has kept his 
thumb on both civilian and military elite through 
repression, execution, and removal of officials from office. 
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These methods have enabled him to remain in power for over 
35 years and are still serving him well. 
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V. U.S. POLICY OPTIONS FOR ENCOURAGING DEMOCRACY IN CUBA 
The U.S. embargo against Cuba, in conjunction with the 
loss of support from the Soviet Union after its fall, has 
made a big impact on Cuba's economy. The lack of fuel, 
food, and consumer goods has been keenly felt by the Cuban 
population. However, as previously stated, the goal of the 
sanctions is not merely to inflict economic hardship on the 
Cuban people. The ultimate goal of the sanctions is the 
destabilization of Castro's regime. So far this goal does 
not seem to be within reach. Castro and his government 
remain in firm control of the country even in the face of 
severe economic hardship and the enforced austerity measures 
of the special period in time of peace. The question 
remains: what is the best policy option for the United 
States to pursue with regard to Cuba? What are the options? 
The first option to decide on is whether to leave the 
sanctions against Cuba in place, or to lift them. Let us 
take a look at both of these scenarios. First, what would 
be likely to happen if the sanctions were left in place? 
Although the regime has not yet been destabilized, 
continuing economic pressure without some form of relief 
would most probably lead to the eventual downfall of the 
regime several years down the road due to the resulting 
deprivation and economic hardship imposed on the population. 
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However, the government has successfully repressed nearly 
all effective opposition in Cuba. There are virtually no 
leaders or organized groups that would be able to come 
forward and implement a new gover~~ent when the old one 
falls. This would lead to a situation of absolute chaos 
with no one in control of thP ~n··~try. It is possible that 
Cuba would become another Ha~~~ : the military in 
control, or even worse, a Somalia with local warlords 
fighting over control of the country. 
Of course, Jorge Mas Canosa and the Cuban American 
National Foundation have reportedly put together a 
provisional government that could step in immediately after 
the regime falls. However, given the fact that this 
government would be made up of Cuban exiles who fled Cuba to 
avoid hardship, political persecution, arrest, to pursue 
economic success unattainable in Cuba, and who are much 
better off than the population that remains in Cuba, they 
are unlikely to be accepted as a legitimate government by 
the Cuban people who have been through the economic 
difficulties of the special period and the repressive 
measures of Castro's regime. In order for this to work, 
this type of provisional government would have to have the 
military backing of the United States. In effect, this 
would more than likely be the equivalent of re-instituting a 
dictatorial government similar to Batista's. With the 
emphasis placed on democratic governments by the United 
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States, picking this option would be bad for the image of 
the United States in the international community. 
Another aspect in considering whether or not to lift the 
embargo is what Castro's behavior is likely to be if the 
economic and political pressure continues to build as a 
result of maintaining the embargo. According to Arquilla, 
in Castro's mind, a confrontational high risk policy toward 
the United States may be in his best interests in order to 
maintain his power. This approach could be put into effect 
by such actions as seeking new allies, "people siphoning" 
(allowing dissidents and other trouble makers to leave the 
country), profiting from the drug trade, and proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical, and 
nuclear weapons). Of course, all of these actions have the 
potential to inflict harm on the United States. When backed 
into a corner with the issue being survival, Castro may lash 
out mercilessly in order to maintain his control over the 
Cuban state and people. He has shown his willingness in the 
past to turn to extreme and risky behavior, for example, 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when the threat of 
Soviet missiles in Cuba brought the United States to the 
brink of nuclear war with the Soviet Union, by aiding 
revolutionary movements in Latin America and Africa, and by 
sending Cuban troops to Angola and Ethiopia. He is 
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obviously not afraid to antagonize the United States in 
order to achieve his goals.'' 
Lifting the embargo against Cuba would alleviate some of 
the economic hardships in Cuba and perhaps help to stabilize 
the government. It would also make the regime less able to 
use the United States as a scapegoat to accuse of all the 
country's problems. The regime would be forced to accept 
responsibility for these problems. This would make it more 
difficult for the regime to keep up the nationalism that 
helps unite the country against the United States. This 
would also put the United States in a better position to 
influence a regime change when Castro finally steps down or 
simply dies. The United States can then enhance this 
position by implementing further policies that will improve 
relations between the two countries. Being in a position to 
influence who takes power will help prevent the power vacuum 
and chaos that would result from a sudden collapse of the 
regime. 
Before ending the sanctions, the United States should 
attempt to negotiate with Fidel Castro his departure from 
the government and the orderly transition of the regime 
toward democracy. This could be done quietly and in a way 
that would allow him to save face- an important point, given 
89John Arquilla, A Decision Modeling Perspective on u.s.-cuba 
Relations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), pp. xii, 7, 16. 
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his intense pride- and that would guarantee his safety, 
another major concern. 
Even Castro admits that the tough realities of life in 
Cuba have forced the government to move toward capitalism. 
Many believe that Castro has been forced to legitimize what 
the Cuban people have already been doing illegally. Castro 
is seen as simply being pragmatic, doing what is necessary 
to remain in power, not as fundamentally changing his ways 
of thinking. Even so, there are more changes in the works 
according to Carlos Lage, Cuba's economics czar. He has 
plans to introduce a new tax system, restructure the 
agricultural sector, and downsize the government workforce. 
There are even rumors of "eliminating government control" 
over who may !eave Cuba. 90 
Castro has been forced to use large amounts of political 
repression and to allow change in the economy in order to 
maintain his power. If he foresees that even these changes 
cannot keep him in power over the long term, he may be 
wiliing to step aside. Much depends on the success of the 
new joint ventures and economic changes taking place in 
Cuba. If they fail, th~ s;ituation can only worsen. In this 
case, negotiations would allow him a way out of a bad 
situation. However, even if castro refuses to s~ep down 
from power, it may still be possible for the United' States 
to negotiate with him. He is making progress toward a 
90McGeary, p. 45. 
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capitalist economy. His willingness to accept and even 
introduce these economic changes could be a signal that he 
would be willing to entertain negotiations. Lifting the 
embargo would allow him to ease up on his repression, and 
this could be negotiated. Finally, even if Castro refuses 
to negotiate, the United States could unilaterally drop the 
sanctions. This could still be to the United States' 
advantage since increased trade and communication with Cuba 
could lead to a decrease in nationalism which could weaken 
the Cuban government's hold on the people. 
So, why should Castro be willing to negotiate an end to 
the embargo with the United States? 1) If he believes that 
continued economic stress brought about by the embargo will 
eventually lead to a disintegration of his regime and thus 
put him in danger of losing power and possibly his life, it 
will give him a way out of the dilemma. 2) If he believes 
his power is secure, it could still be to his advantage to 
negotiate an end to thP embargo. This could lead to a 
strengthening of the ~u~an economy due to U.S. investment, 
technology, and tourism, perhaps in return for an 
improvement in the area of human rights and free elections. 
With an improved economy, he would not have to apply so much 
repression to keep the population under control. He could 
afford to let up on the pressure. 
Ending the embargo could lead to a more immediate 
reduction of the repression inflicted by the regime on the 
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Cuban population. This could allow more t·oom and resources 
for action to Cuban elites who favor reform. It could also 
allow civil society to develop more fully, including 
nongovernment actors. These social and political groups 
would be extremely important in the development of a 
democratic government. It could even lead eventually to 
free and fair elections in Cuba. Another important result 
from lifting the embargo would be that U.S. companies could 
compete with European and other investors in Cuba for 
business. Also, it would be good for the image of the 
United States in Latin America to be seen to be making 
conciliation with Cuba. 91 This has long been a sore spot 
in U.S. foreign relations with certain Latin American 
countries. Mexico, for example, has traditionally traded 
and continued its relations with Cuba despite the U.S. 
economic and diplomatic sanctions placed on Cuba. 
Another option for U.S. policy which does not seem worth 
pursuing is to increase pressure against Cuba. This could 
include sharply restricting legal and illegal immigration to 
the United States, thus increasing social and political 
pressures in Cuba by forcing dissidents to remain in Cuba; 
and U.S. military intervention, perhaps in the guise of 
humanitarian intervention if the situation seems to worsen 
and get more chaotic. 92 However, according to Dahl, 
91 Gonzalez, pp. 69-70. 
92Gonzalez, p. 66. 
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military intervention or conquest has not worked well in the 
recent past to help institute a democratic government. In 
fact, this method has been found to have worked in only four 
countries- those that were defeated by the Allied powers in 
World War II- Austria, the German Federal Republic, Italy, 
and Japan. It has been suggested that these are 
historically unique cases that are unlikely to be repeated 
elsewhere. It is also unlikely that a stable democracy will 
result from a sudden collapse of the old regime because in 
this case the new regime may lack legitimacy and some 
citizens will remain loyal to the old regime. This path to 
democracy has been infrequent in the past. 93 
According to Dahl, in the future as in the past, stable 
democracies (or polyarchies as he calls them) are more 
likely to result from slow "evolutionary processes than the 
revolutionary overthrow of the existing hegemonies." A few 
examples of this type of evolutionary process are: Great 
Britain, Belgium, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Uruguay. 94 
Taking this into consideration, the best course of action 
for the United States would seem to be to encourage this 
evolutionary process toward democracy. The most effective 
way to achieve this would be to increase information flow 
93Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 42-43. 
94Dahl, pp. 42, 45. 
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and communication between the United States and Cuba at the 
level of both the government and the private individual. 
Learning about the United States, democracy, and capitalism 
will show the Cuban population what the outside world is 
like, and perhaps motivate them to reform their government 
and economy. This type of policy, in conjunction with the 
military arms race during the Cold War and the resulting 
bankruptcy it caused, is what led to the fall of the Soviet 
Union and other communist countries in the Eastern Bloc. 
Increased communication and information flow to Cuba can 
be achieved in several ways. Currently, certain items are 
allowed into Cuba under the terms of the embargo: books, 
periodicals, microfiche, records, compact discs. Direct 
marketing of these items is prohibited, but their 
distribution could be increased by dropping the embargo and 
allowing sales. Telephone communications could be increased 
which would also allow for greater exchanges by facsimile 
machines, and especially computers. Also very important are 
computer hardware and software, electronic mail, and 
computer networks (these are becoming increasingly important 
in the academic world). These items and capabilities are 
especially important for Cuba to become competitive in the 
business world and may attract U.S. businesses to the 
country (or at least the lack of them might keep them away). 
Cuba is currently training its young people to use computers 
and develop computer hardware and software. It also 
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convenes international conferences addressing these areas. 
Cuba does have access to several computer networks already, 
and can keep in touch with important academic research and 
activist networks around the world. Common technological 
tools such as facsimile and copy machines, desktop 
publishing equipment, and video cameras would be useful to 
human rights groups in spreading information and documenting 
human rights abuses by the regime to the rest of the 
world. 95 
U.S.-sponsored Radio Marti and TV Marti have been good 
sources of information from outside Cuba. However, some 
have questioned whether their objectives of encouraging the 
development of civil society in Cuba and maintaining contact 
between the Cuban exile community and the Cuban population 
have been compromised. Their programming has highlighted 
Jorge Mas Canosa, leader of the Cuban American National 
Foundation (CANF), while ignoring vocal Cuban based 
dissidents, such as Elizardo Sanchez. Elliot Abrams, former 
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, has 
objected to this strategy since it makes Washington appear 
to favor the CANF in what is perceived to be a future power 
struggle. This falls right in line with Castro's propaganda 
that the United States is in collusion with Cuban-American 
millionaires. 96 
95Gonzalez, pp. 71-74. 
96Gonzalez, pp. 72-73. 
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Person to person and group to group contacts should be 
encouraged. This could be done by removing the restrictions 
imposed on travel to Cuba by U.S. citizens. Visits and 
exchanges between academics, scientists, teachers, and other 
professionals could be promoted. 97 Perhaps more 
importantly, tourism and business contacts should be 
encouraged. Contacts between these groups of people would 
lead to a freer flow of technological, political, economic, 
and business ideas. Even though Castro and his regime are 
probably aware of the far reaching implications of these 
policies and would try to counteract and control them, they 
also know that high tech information, equipment, and people 
are essential to the growth of business and joint ventures. 
They may be willing to take the risk, as they are already 
doing with Western European countries, Canada, and others. 
In the long run a policy increasing the free flow of ideas 
and communication could lead to political reform in Cuba. 
Finally, investment and perhaps even aid to Cuba should 
be encouraged. Cuba's wallowing economy is one of the main 
issues used by Castro to place blame on the United States. 
This has traditionally galvanized the Cuban population by 
increasing the nationalism of the country. Without this 
tool, Castro would be forced to either accept the blame for 
the economic problems, or alternatively, the United States 
97Gonzalez, pp. 74-75. 
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may be seen in a more positive light by the Cuban people if 
the economy improves. 
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VI. INCEMTIVBS AND IMPEDIMENTS TO LIFTING THE EMBARGO 
AGAINST CUBA 
While it is impossible to precisely m~asure the economic 
effects of the embargo of Cuba in the United States, it is 
safe to assume ~ht~e are some. Evidence of this is the fact 
that many Western European countries, Canada, Mexico, and 
others, have been trading for quite some time with Cuba, and 
are interested in forming joint ventures with the island. 
Exactly what the potential profit would be and whether trade 
and investment would be successful is impossible to 
determine at this point in time. However, according to one 
source, Cuba would welcome the investment and expertise of 
U.S. firms in their country. 98 
One source states that without the embargo, che United 
States would hypothetically have exported $432 million worth 
of goods to Cuba in 1987. Instead, because of the embargo, 
it actually exported only $1 million worth of goods. This 
amounted to a loss in that year of $431 million dollars. 
Another 1988 study estimated that U.S. firms had lost $30 
billion in exports to Cuba in 25 years, due to the embargo. 
Meanwhile, countries in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in that same year 
~•"cuba Learns," Forbes, 28 Feb. 1994, p. 68. 
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exported $882 million worth of goods to Cuba. 99 Obviously, 
other advanced countries are taking advantage of i11e 
opportunity to trade with Cuba. Clearly, U.S. companies are 
missing out on potential trade with Cuba. With Cuba's 
prox1mity to the United States and Cuba's need for 
technology, the Unit~d States would be a natural trading and 
business partner for Cuba and Cuban firms. 
There are several impediments involved in lifting the 
embargo a~ainst Cuba. The first is the American people. 
With the end of tne Cold War, many people simply no longer 
care about the issue since it does not impinge on their 
everyday lives. The non-Cuban sector of the U.S. 
population, at least among those who are better informed and 
care enough to have formed an opinion, is split on the 
issue. Many of these U.S. citizens would be opposeJ to an 
easing of sanctions. TherE' is still some anti-communist, 
anti-Castro sentiment left even though the Cold War has 
ended. People old envugh to remember the Cuban Missile 
Crisis will not easily forget the part Castro and Cuba had 
to play in it. Also, Castro is not an easy man to like, 
with his anti-U.S. rhetoric and nationalism. He and his 
regime are one of the la~~ remnants of communism in the 
world and one of the few nondemocratic regimes left in the 
Western Hemisphere. For these rE'asons, many U.S. citizens 
would pr~fer to continue the embargo indefinitely. 
99Hufbauer, pp. 81, 200. 
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However, there are also many in the United States who 
are too young to ~emember the events of the missile crisis 
and see the sanctions against Cuba as one of the last relics 
of the Cold War. This group would favor a lifting of the 
embargo. They would be well represented by two reporters 
who recently travelled to Cuba. According to these 
reporters, U.S. travellers to Cuba are struck by the 
deprivations that the embargo is placing on the Cuban 
people, who are viewed as the innocent victims of the 
sanctions. Shortages of food, medicine, fuel, school 
supplies, and factory parts are causing suffering and 
severely affecting their quality of life. Children leave 
school to beg for money from tourists, and prostitution and 
theft have also increased with the increase in tourism. 
They also state that we are alienating our trading partners 
and humiliating the United Nations due to our hardline 
stance against Cuba. They believe our policy toward Cuba 
caters to the right wing Cuban American National Foundation 
who wants only to reclaim power in Cuba. 100 There are 
obviously other Americans in this country who hold similar 
views. 
The embargo has also caused some heated debate in the 
Cuban American community. At one extreme is Jorge Mas 
Canosa and the conservative Cuban American National 
100Axel Meyer and Cecile Meyer, Letter, New York Times, 
16 May 1994, sec. A, p. 10. 
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Foundation, who would like to maintain a strict embargo 
until a total strangling of the Cuban economy leads to a 
collapse of Castro and his regime, and who then intend to 
send in their own previously formed Cuban government. This 
group fights to stop an easing of sanctions against Cuba. 
They are very powerful, especially in Florida and 
Washington, DC. A good number of them are the old elite who 
fled Cuba to avoid the outcome of the Cuban Revolution. 
They are extremely involved in politics and exert great 
influence. It was mainly due to their efforts, along with 
Representative Robert Torricelli, that the Torricelli Bill, 
also known as the Cuban Democracy Act, was passed and signed 
into law in 1992. 
On the other hand, a new generation of Cuban Americans 
is emerging- a younger, less conservative group. They are 
less concerned about taking vengeance against Castro, and 
more concerned about the fate of their families and friends 
who remain in Cuba and are currently experiencing the 
effects of economic crisis. Members of this more liberal 
group are the ones who send most of the U.S. dollars and 
basic necessities and luxuries to their relatives, now that 
this action has been legalized by U.S. law. 
These more moderate groups, such as Cambia Cubano, the 
Cuban Committee for Democracy, and the Cuban American 
Committee for Peace, are asking for improved relations 
between the United States and Cuba. Raymundo Del Taro, 
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President of the Cuban American Committee for Peace, has 
accused the conservative Cuban exiles (such as Alpha 66) of 
mak~ng death threats against more moderate Cubans who speak 
their views. He has also labelled Representative Torricelli 
as an opportunistic politician and Jorge Mas Canosa an 
egomaniac, and accused them of formulating policies that 
cause suffering to loved ones in Cuba. He would like to see 
the Cuban market opened to U.S. businesses, so that they can 
compete with Latin American, European, Asian, and Canadian 
companies and supply Cuba with enough food and medicine to 
make a real improvement in the Cuban situation. He believes 
this can only be done by trade, not through the small amount 
of goods allowed by charity. These people also want to be 
able to visit their families in both Cuba and the United 
States. Some even want to invest in Cuba. These moderates 
are becoming more numerous and are willing to speak up about 
these issues even though there is some risk to them from the 
conservatives. 101 
Another group that will make it hard to lift the embargo 
is the U.S. policymakers and politicians. As previously 
discussed, the U.S. Congress recently passed the Cuban 
Democracy Act, in large part due to the efforts of 
Representative Torricelli who sponsored the bill. This 
gives a good indication of the mindset of U.S. policymakers 
101 Raymundo Del Taro, Letter, New York Times, 16 May 1994, 
sec. A, p. 10. 
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in Washington. Due to the strong influence of the CANF and 
the expected response of the American public, many will 
naturally be afraid to be seen supporting an easing of 
sanctions and bridging the gap between the two countries. 
For some politicians it would be seen as political suicide. 
Even President Clinton tried to win the state of Florida in 
the 1992 presidential election by supporting a tightening of 
the embargo, although this strategy did not win him the 
state. 102 
This is in great contrast to current U.S. policy toward 
other communist countries. China is a good example of this 
type of policy. It has been granted most favored nation 
(MFN) trading status for many years, despite the fact that 
it remains communist and uses repressive measures against 
its citizens. It is true that the United States has 
recently threatened to take away this privileged status, but 
it has decided to end these threats. In late May 1994, 
President Clinton announced that the goal of the improvement 
of human rights in China would no longer be linked to U.S. 
trade policy. Instead, the United States extended most 
favored nation trading status to China. The current goal is 
to keep trade and communication links open to China in order 
to try to influence them. 103 The similarities to Cuba are 
102Del Taro, Letter. 
103ABC News, Speech by President Clinton, 25 May 1994. 
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obvious, yet the policy implementation is 180 degrees 
different. 
Of course, the main difference is that at one time Cuba 
was practically U.S. territory. There were close economic 
links between the two countries, a high level of political 
involvement in Cuba on the part of the United States, and 
U.S. tourists flocked to Cuba as if it was their own 
backyard. When this close relationship was severed, it 
created extreme animosity on both sides. This has made it 
harder to reconcile the two countries. It has also made it 
easy for Castro to denounce U.S. imperialism. However, 
after a prolonged period of time a grudge such as this 
ceases to serve a useful purpose and becomes a feud which is 
simply carried on because that is the way things have always 
been- it is difficult for either side to change its behavior 
toward the other, the pattern has been set. 
Another example is Vietnam, also a communist country. 
The United States implemented an embargo against communist 
controlled areas of Vietnam in 1958. This embargo was 
extended to all of Vietnam in April of 1975, when South 
Vietnam fell to the Communists. 10 ' This embargo was 
recently lifted by the United States, again showing the 
differential treatment given to various communist countries. 
10
'U. S. Cong. , House, Subcommittee on International Trade and 
Commerce of the Committee on International Relations, Export 
Licensing of Private Humanitarian Assistance to Vietnam, 94th 
Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 9 Sep. 1975), p. 21. 
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A major difference between China and Vietnam on the one 
hand, and Cuba on the other, is that China and Vietnam are 
embracing capitalism and are becoming fairly successful at 
it (that, along with the fact that they are much farther 
removed from the United States than Cuba). However, with 
Cuba beginning to make a movement toward capitalism, should 
the United States continue to treat Cuba differently? And 
if it does, how can it justify this policy to the rest of 
the world? And finally, how can we encourage Cuba's 
progress toward capitalism and a transition to democracy? 
It is time to change our policy. I believe it is time for a 
more pragmatic approach toward Cuba. It is time to try to 
restore Cuba to the international sphere. This could 
benefit the United States economically (however slightly), 
as well as be a more effective way to pursue its goals for 
Cuba of steering them toward a more capitalist economy and 
democratic government. Our policy toward Cuba is out of 
line with our policy toward other socialist countries, such 
as Vietnam, a country toward which the United States has 
also had a long standing embargo which it recently decided 
to lift. 
Admittedly, dropping the embargo could prove to be very 
difficult politically, given the strong feelings many 
American citizens and politicians would have against this 
move. It would also be a very delicate matter to negotiate 
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with Castro. However, it would be worthwhile to work toward 
this goal. 
The Clinton Administration recently announced that the 
"enlargement of democracy" was its new alternative to 
replace the strategy of containment. It is unclear exactly 
what this means since this strategic concept has not been 
clarified the way containment was. Containment was clearly 
spelled out, so that day-to-day policy could be implemented 
from it. According to Kissinger, there are still several 
questions that need to be answered: 
What precisely does enlargement of democracy mean? 
Whom does it imply we should support? With what 
means? ... This tendency toward abstraction is compounded 
by an extraordinary obsession with rublic relations. 
Exorbitant attention is devoted to blunting short-term 
domestic criticism, treating foreign policy as if it 
were a domestic issue susceptible to consensus through 
trade-offs. But foreign affairs is a continuing 
process; segmenting it into individual cases generally 
ends up offending everybody, at home and abroad. 105 
Whatever is meant by enlargement of democracy, it cannot 
mean supporting only our allies and those countries that are 
already democracies. This would be simply maintaining the 
status quo, not enlarging democracy. It seems that in order 
to actually enlarge democracy, the United States must also 
be willing to reach out and encourage democracy in those 
countries it is not on such friendly terms with, as well as 
those that are not yet democracies. U.S. policy toward and 
relations with our neighbor, Cuba, would be a good place for 
105Henry A. Kissinger, "At Sea in a New World," Newsweek, 6 
Jun. 1994, p.37. 
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President Clinton to start. If the United States is truly 
moving toward this new strategy and is not just spouting 
rhetoric, it should adjust its policy toward Cuba to be more 
in line with this strategy and more in line with its 
treatment of other communist countries, such as China and 
Vietnam. Otherwise, the United States will appear to be 
arbitrary and lacking a plan for its foreign policy. This 
arbitrary treatment of certain countries has made Latin 
American countries wary of the United States in the past-
this is only to be expected when its policies and actions 
cannot be anticipated, but are only determined on a case by 
case basis. This gives the appearance of being fickle. 
With this in mind, a lifting of the embargo against Cuba 
in order to encourage a transition to democracy would be an 
excellent opportunity for the Clinton Administration to make 
good their new strategy. When approached in this light, it 
would have a greater chance of being accepted by the 
American people. 
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VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD 
CUBA 
There will certainly be a change in regime in Cuba 
sometime in the future, if not by revolution or by coup, 
then by Castro's death. It is better for the United States 
to be in a position to help influence this transition than 
to be seen as the enemy as they now are in Cuba. The 
embargo and current policy merely help the present regime to 
preserve itself by shifting the blame for Cuba's problems 
from the regime to the United States. Once the scapegoat is 
removed, Cuban citizens will be more likely to see where the 
blame really belongs. For this reason, the U.S. embargo 
against Cuba should be removed. Although there is no love 
lost between the United States government and its citizens, 
and Fidel Castro and his regime, the United States can 
afford to be pragmatic and begin to change its policy toward 
Cuba. Since the fall of the Soviet Union and consequently 
the communist threat, Cuba has in effect become emasculated. 
Of course, it will not be easy for either the United 
States or Cuba to form closer relations, but I believe it to 
be necessary if the United States wants to have an influence 
on any future regime change in Cuba. Although Castro still 
has a firm grip on the country, without a change in the 
state of the economy and the ability to pay cash for 
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imports, the regime will eventually topple. In the 
meantime, the country will become more and more of a 
shambles and its ability to recover from the crisis will 
greatly diminish. In this type of situation, where there is 
a power vacuum, chaos will ensue and there is no telling 
wt.at type of government, will eventually emerge. The United 
States does not need another potential Somalia brewing in 
Cuba, with no real government, and warlords fighting each 
other for their share of the island. If the situation 
eroded to this point, it would be very difficult indeed for 
the United States to have any kind of influence over the 
succeeding regime. Even occupation of the island might do 
little more than provide a small amount of stability to the 
country. While there have been some successful military 
interventions by the United States in Latin America, such as 
in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and Panama in 1989, the 
majority have not been that successful. Past occupations of 
Latin American countries, such as the 1914 occupation of 
Veracruz in Mexico, while temporarily improving stability, 
infrastructure, sanitation, and overall quality of life, are 
not permanent solutions. Under the U.S. military regime in 
Veracruz, the Mexicans had no say in their own government. 
Shortly after the American evacuation of Veracruz, the city 
quickly returned to its former state. "Within a few weeks 
it was difficult to tell that the Americans had ever 
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occupied the city." 106 This has been typical of U.S. 
occupations in Latin America. There is no reason to believe 
that an invasion and subsequent occupation of Cuba would be 
any different. Besides, the United States can no longer 
afford prolonged military adventures and occupations, either 
monetarily or politically. 
The solution to this problem is to begin tentative 
negotiations with Castro in order to promote a change of 
regime and then to drop the embargo. Unfortunately, this 
will be difficult due to domestic politics in the United 
States (in no small measure due to the influence of the 
Cuban American National Foundation or CANF) and Castro's 
hubris or pride. The United States must seek a way to both 
deal with the CANF and to try to find a way for Castro to 
save face. Although it is impossible to determine the 
truth, Castro himself has hinted at the possibility of his 
stepping down "in return for an end to the embargo and a 
normalization of relations." He is quoted as saying, "If I 
were the obstacle, I would be willing to give not only my 
positions and my responsibilities, but even my life. " 107 
Once the embargo has ended, the next step would be to 
increase communications between U.S. and Cuban citizens 
through a further increase in telephone, fax, and computer 
106Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the 
Occupation of Veracruz (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1962), 
pp. 123-154, 169-171. 
107Schulz, "The United States and Cuba," p. 95. 
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communication, tourism, and business links. It was this 
type of free flow of information and ideas that allowed a 
crack to form in the crusty exterior of communism in the 
Soviet Union. This crack led to the eventual crumbling of 
the communist regime, Russia's current attempt at democracy, 
and to the end of the Cold war that has brought the United 
States to this point of being able to begin reconsidering 
its own foreign policies. 
Finally, the United States should encourage capitalism 
by encouraging U.S. business ventures in Cuba. This also 
helped bring about the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
Eastern Bloc. Even China has moved dramatically in this 
direction. The problem will be for the United States to be 
seen as a partner, not as the age old enemy stepping in to 
take unfair advantage of a Cuba that is in severe crisis. 
Any busin&ss ventures must be beneficial to both the 
investors and Cuba. One way of encouraging the investment 
of U.S. businesses would be for the United States government 
to guarantee them against loss. This way U.S. firms would 
have relatively little to lose, and potentially quite a bit 
to gain. 
These actions could be augmented by allowing Cuba to 
return to full formal participation in the Organization of 
American States (OAS) from which it has been excluded from 
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formal participation since 1962. 108 This would help bring 
Cuba back into the diplomatic and economic activities of the 
Western Hemisphere. Other Latin American states may be able 
to exert considerable influence over Cuba in this respect. 
Obviously, these steps will not be easy to take and to 
take successfully, but if successful, they will be the most 
effective way for the United States to have an impact on any 
regime transition that takes place in Cuba. This path would 
hopefully also lead to an improved and stable capitalist 
economy and an attempt at a new, democratic regime. 
108Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1992 
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